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It is held that existentials in Chinese express the existence of things rather than events.
We propose the term event-existential, in contrast to thing-existentials, to capture
those clauses whose existents are obviously events. These include the so-called
pseudo-existentials, clauses with the possessor as subject and the possessed as
object, (dis)appearance existentials, etc. Though the two types of existentials are
both composed of “NGL ^ VG ^ NG”, the syntax is different. In thing-existentials, the
clause-final NG constitutes the existent, whose existence is expressed through the
configuration of the three elements as such. In event-existentials, the configuration
of “VG ^ NG” expresses the event, whose existence is then asserted through its
alignment with the clause-initial NGL. Apart from existence, event-existentials show
the semantic features of eventuality, impersonality, and ergativity. The two types of
existentials form a continuum, each occupying a pole and relating to the other
through different degrees of thingness/eventuality, i.e., different degrees of prominence
of the clause-final NG and the clause-middle VG and of the integration of the two.
Keywords: Existentials; Things; Events; Impersonality; ErgativityAbout the term of existential
The term existential in Chinese is first put forward by Lü (1943). He defines the exist-
ential in terms of meaning, which is quite different from what is meant by the term
today. Later on, Lü (1946) redefines existentials as clauses expressing the meaning of
existence and (dis)appearance. Since the 1950s, the existential as a special syntactic
construction has been much discussed, with new insights appearing from time to time.
The frequently addressed topics include its definition, scope and classification, the
semantic and syntactic features of the three components of the existential, i.e., the
locative nominal group (NGL), the verbal group (VG), and the nominal group (NG) in
that order. In recent years, new observations are made with the application of gene-
rative linguistics, functional linguistics, and cognitive linguistics to the study of the
construction.
This study reviews the discussion on the scope and classification of existentials and
proposes the term of event-existential, in contrast to thing-existential. The former cap-
tures a few constructions that are related to the latter; the two types of existentials are
alike but different. We will try to bring out the semantic and functional features of
event-existentials by drawing on Systemic Functional Grammar.2014 Wang and Zhou; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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when classifying and defining the scope of the existential. On the one hand, not all
clauses expressing existence can be taken as existentialsa:
(1) is an existential whereas (2) is not, though they both convey the meaning of exist-
ence. On the other hand, some constructions may share some syntactic features with
the existential, but they should not be regarded as such:
Lei (1993) lists three conditions for a clause to be called an existential: 1) Semantically,
it asserts the existence of something, that is, there exists something (New) in someplace
(Given). 2) Syntactically, it observes the sequence of “NGL ^ VG ^ NG”. And 3) the
VG can be replaced by yǒu. Shao et al. (2009: 146) consider the existential as a spe-
cial construction in Modern Chinese and they agree that both semantic and syntactic
considerations are necessary in defining the existential. Zhang (2009: 243) recognizes
the pragmatic characteristics in addition to the semantic and syntactic ones. That is,
the existential typically functions to introduce a new entity into the discourse, which
will be elaborated on in the text that follows.
Chen (1957) proposes the term (dis)appearance existentials:
Chen (1957) explains that such clauses resemble existentials: they both can be an-
alyzed into the three elements of “NGL ^ VG ^ NG”. Notionally, appearance and dis-
appearance are the beginning and the end of existence respectively. Therefore, they
can be taken as existentials in that they asserts the existence of something instead of
representing actions or behaviours. Song (2007) distinguishes existential clauses
from clauses of (dis)appearance, both of which can be subsumed under the term
cúnxiànjù (clauses of existence and (dis)appearance).
We think that it is implausible to take clauses of disappearance (e.g., (5)) as a kind of
existential, though they share some syntactic features with existentials. For one thing,
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of the existential is to assert existence, which is presupposed in clauses of disappear-
ance. To say that existence can be asserted through disappearance is to put the cart be-
fore the horse. For another, pragmatically, such clauses are not used to introduce new
entities into the discourse, as existentials typically do. A simple examination of the con-
struction (e.g., ……sǐle yígèrén. (死了一个人, “a person died in …”) in the Corpus of
Modern Chinese, Centre for Chinese Linguistics, PKU shows that none of the tokens
yielded serves the function of introducing new entities into the discourse. This shows
that it is questionable to take clauses of disappearance as a subtype of existential.
Another much addressed and controversial issue concerns the distinction between
dynamic and static existentials and the so-called pseudo-existentials. Fan (1963) regards such
clauses as (3) and Chuāngwài piāozhe dàxuě (“It’s snowing heavily outside the window.”) as
dynamic. She observes that “the verbs in these clauses can be preceded by such progressive
markers as zhèng or zài, to denote ongoing processes”. In the same vein, Song (2007: 16)
defines dynamic and static existentials according to whether the verb in the clause expresses
a state, an action, or an ongoing process. But the notion of dynamic existentials is contro-
versial. Fan (1963), Zhang (1982), Li (1986), and Dai (1988) think that (3) is a dynamic exist-
ential; whereas Zhu (1980) and Lei (1993) object to including such clauses into existentials
merely on the grounds of syntactic similarities; without taking semantics into consideration.
Song (1988, 2007) shows how (6) and (7) are different:
According to Song, the VGs in (6) (zuòzhe) and (7) (pǎozhe) denote a state and a dy-
namic action, thus rendering the existentials static and dynamic respectively. He fur-
ther explicates that (6) and (7) are different from (3); the former belong to existentials
while the latter does not. Lu (1997: 24–26) shows how (3) and (6) are different in struc-
ture and in semantics through transformational analysis and he attributes the differences to
the semantic structure of the verb. Thus, it is realized that, though (3) is syntactically similar
to the existential, it is not an existential. Song (1988) coins the term pseudo-existential to
refer to it. But this term just shows that they are not real existentials; it does not tell us the
defining characteristics (either semantic or syntactic) of the clause, neither does it explicate
how it is related to the existential.
Another type of related clause is the one with the possessor as subject and the possessed
as object (PSPO clause) (Guo 1990), as exemplified by:
Li (1987) has noticed the similarities between (8) and the existential. After a dia-
chronic survey, Shi (2007) comes to the conclusion that (8) derives from the existential,
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subject, rather than experiencer of the event. Therefore it is not essentially different
from the existential. Li (2009) puts forward the term occurrence clause to cover both
clauses of (dis)appearance and PSPO clauses. It means that “some event occurs in some
place”. Ren (2009) probes into the similarities between the semantic categories of “pos-
session” and “existence and appearance” and the relatedness between existentials and
such clauses as (8) by drawing on the theory of construction grammar. Zhang (2012)
posits that clauses such as (8) and existentials exhibit a kind of isomerism as a result of
the semantic extension of the verbs in question. They share common features in word
order, in the argument structure of the verb, and in semantics. These are believed to be
semantically and functionally motivated. But the relatedness of the two constructions
and the motivations behind need be further investigated.
In the literature, a commonly held opinion is that the verb in the existential can be
replaced by the typical existential verb yǒu (Fan 1963, Lei 1993, Song 2007: 99–100).
But when this happens, the meaning may be radically changed, though the resulting
clause remains grammatically acceptable. Compare (9) and (10):
Though the existence of the oil lamp is expressed in both (9) and (10), it is asserted
in the latter and entailed or even presupposed in the former. (9) asserts the oil lamp’s
state of being lighted. This is more evident in (11):
(11) asserts the rolling of beads of sweat, rather than the existence of them.
With regard to such controversies and problems in the literature, we put forward the
term event-existential. In what follows, we will discuss the scope of event existentials,
their functional/semantic features, and the continuous relationship between thing- and
event- existentials.
The scope of event-existentials
Lyons (1977: 442–445) distinguishes three types of entities: first-order, second-order, and
third-order entities. Generally speaking, first-order entities are physical objects such as ani-
mals, people, plants, artifacts, e.g., dog, woman, tulip, and car. The ontological statuses of these
entities are relatively stable from a perceptual point of view. They exist in three-dimensional
space, at any point in time, and they are publicly observable. Second-order entities are events,
processes/activities, and states; they are what are referred to as “states of affairs”. These entities
are located in time and are said to occur/take place. Third-order entities are abstract; they are
outside both space and time. These include facts, concepts, ideas, possibilities, and proposi-
tions (Lyons 1977: 442ff, Vendler 1967/2002: 242, 244, 246, Dik 1997: 136).
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to second-order entities in Lyons’ terms and states of affairs in Dik’s (1997) terms. This is a
cover term including actions, activities, situations, conditions, processes, etc., which can
be predicated by such verbs as occur, last, begin, end, cause, etc. (Peterson 1997: 92).
In Chinese, existentials not only assert the existence of things, but also that of events.
However, it is taken for granted that they are only to express the existence of things.
On the other hand, there are those clause patterns that are formally similar to the existen-
tial, but the existents in them are not things but events. The so-called pseudo-existentials
(e.g., (3)) are cases in point.
There are three authors who have discussed event-existentials, though the terms they em-
ploy are different. Lin (2008: 74–76) finds that the following two clauses are different:
(12) is an existential clause, whereas (13) is an occurrence clause, which expresses the
occurrence of an event. According to Lin, yǒu and fāshēng are both light verbs and they
both take locative nominals as subjects. In existentials, the locative element denotes the
place where something exists. But in occurrence clause, it does not necessarily refer to
the setting where the event in question occurs, e.g.:
Lin (2008: 76) notes that the above example expresses that the event of the sinking of two
boats occurred and that wǒmen cūnzilǐ (“our village”) is not the place where the sinking oc-
curred; it denotes the entity affected by the event. He (Lin 2008: 76) thinks that (8) is a
clause of occurrence, with Wáng Miǎn as the locative subject. But Lin (2008) is an exclusive
study of the locative subject in Chinese. He only mentions occurrence clauses in passing.
Li (2009) throws doubt on plausibility of clauses of disappearance as a sub-type of ex-
istentials, for she finds they seldom occur in actual texts. Even with those few examples,
it can hardly be said that they express the disappearance of something:
Li’s (2009) investigation shows that such clauses are not employed to convey the
meaning of “there (dis)appears something in someplace”, but to assert the occurrence
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stricted to it. Li suggests the term clause of occurrence in contrast to clause of exist-
ence. The former includes such clauses as (3) and (8), and parts of traditional
existentials. However, she does not formally define the term, neither does she explicate
its domain or how it is related to traditional existentials. What’s more, though the term
occurrence caters for the meaning of “VG ^ NG”, it does not take into consideration
the whole construction (see (22)). We hold that different configurations convey differ-
ent meanings, and that the clause initial NGL is obligatory for the whole clause to be
called an event-existential.
In English, there is not such a distinction between thing- and event- existentials; the
same construction (i.e., there-existential) can be used to assert the existence of both
types of entities (Halliday 2004: 256):
Of the above three examples, (17) expresses the existence of things (i.e., aboriginal
paintings that tell the legends of this ancient people), and (18) and (19) that of events
(i.e., comparable political campaign and confusion, shouting and breaking of chairs
respectively). Halliday (2004: 258) writes: “In principle, there can ‘exist’ any kind of
phenomenon that can be construed as a ‘thing’: person, object, institution, abstraction,
but also any action and event…” In English actions and events can be nominalized as
things. But this is not available in Chinese, where existence of second-order entities has to
be conveyed through processes. Compare:
Event-existentials resemble thing-existentials in having the following syntactic
configuration:
Semantically, the former expresses occurrence of events or existence of states. The
prototypical process for thing-existentials is yǒu and that for event-existentials is fāshēng
(Tao 2001: 151). The probe for thing-existentials is: What is there (in NGL)? That for
event-existentials is: What is happening there (in NGL)?
The examples discussed above, including (5), (8), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (20),
are all event-existentials. Some of them are considered thing-existentials, others PSPO
clauses, still others dynamic existentials or clauses of (dis)appearance in previous stud-
ies. We will show how each of them fit into event-existentials.
We begin with so-called pseudo-existentials. These are exemplified by (3) and (20).
Since they look like thing-existentials (both share the structure of (22)), they are often
treated as such (Song 2007: 98). But they are not. Fan (1963) brings out their difference
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thing-existentials:
But this cannot be applied to event-existentials, e.g.,
The yǒu-replacement test is valid in showing that clauses such as (3) are not real existen-
tials. Along this line of analysis, we cannot help but ask: What are pseudo-existentials, if
they are not genuine existentials (i.e., thing-existentials)? How do we explain the differences
between them? The concept of event-existentials can help answer these questions. The exis-
tents in event-existentials are not things, but events. (3) is not to assert the existence of xì,
but the happening of the performance or the singing of it. Both types of existentials express
existence by virtue of the configuration of the initial NGL and the two following elements,
though the latter are different in meaning (see the next section).
Second, PSPO clauses are also event-existentials. Apart from (8) and (14), (24) is an-
other example.
As we reviewed in the preceding section, some scholars notice that such clauses are
related to existentials; they even believe that they belong to existentials. However, it is
evident that (8), (14), and (24) are not to assert the existence of fùqīn, liǎngsōu chuán,
and kèrén. Rather they express the meanings that the events of “father died”, “two boats
sank”, and “guest came to visit” occur to Wáng Miǎn, cūnzi, and Xiào Zhǎng respectively.
On the other hand, Wáng Miǎn and fùqīn, cūnzi and liǎngsōu chuán, and Xiào Zhǎng and
kèrén stand in a relationship of possessor and possessed respectively. Cross-linguistically,
possession is not inherently different from location. To be specific, possessors are locative.
They may take such case forms as locative, adessive, or prepositions and locative words;
these are locative in nature (Lyons 1967, Clark 1978: 118, Freeze 1992, Zeitoun et al.
1999, Baron & Herslund 2001, Abdoulaye 2006, Peeters et al. 2006, Wang and Zhou
2012, Wang and Xu 2013). This explains the relatedness of existentials and PSPO clauses:
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with the existent being things in the former, and events in the latter.
Similarly, clauses of disappearance (e.g., (5)) are event-existentials, for the simple rea-
son that they express existence/occurrence of events rather than things. Finally, it
should be pointed out that, as the above discussion suggests, thing existentials do not
constitute a homogeneous category. Those existentials whose processes are realized by
verbal groups other than yǒu denote the occurrence/existence of event to some extent.
Thing-existentials and event-existentials form a continuum. This is what we will elaborate
on in the following two sections.Functional analysis of event-existentials
As we have shown, thing- and event- existentials share the structure of (22), and they
both express existential meaning by virtue of the configuration of the clause-initial
NGL and the following VG and NG. Their major semantic difference lies with the existent.
In thing-existentials, the existent is realized by the clause final NG. But the realization of
the event meaning needs some explication.
As we have shown above, (5), (8), and (20) are not to assert the existence of kèrén,
fùqīn, and huì respectively. These realize the event meaning zǒule kèrén (“guest left”),
sǐle fùqīn (“father died”), and kāihuì (“have a meeting”) when configured with the VGs
in question. This is even more explicit in (20), where huì is not a thing by nature. Its
function is to realize the event meaning of “have a meeting” when combined with the
verb kāi. The event functions as the existent in event-existentials.
The nucleus of an event is the process realized by the VG. It is indispensable to the event.
This explains why the VG in event-existentials can neither be omitted nor replaced by yǒu
(see section "The scope of event-existentials")b. Furthermore, in some cases the clause-
middle VG and clause-final NG are so closely integrated that they cannot be separated from
one another and form one word in the language, e.g., chàngxì in (3) and kāihuì in (20).
Tables 1 and 2 show the differences between the two types of existentials.
As is shown in Table 1, thing-existentials can be analyzed into three semantic elements:
Location ^ Process ^ Existent. They are realized by NGL, VG, and NG (denoting the
thing) respectively. With event-existentials, the analysis is of two levels as is shown in
Table 2. At the first level, the clause is a configuration of “Location ^ Existent”, realized by
the NGL and the Event in that order. At the second level, the Event is further analyzed
into “Process ^ Range” by virtue of the fact chàngzhe and xì are highly integrated and the
latter is not so much a participant of the process as a refinement and specification of it
(Halliday 2004: 295)c. That is to say, the Process and the Range do not play any direct role
in the whole clause; they function by constituting the Event. The latter configures with
the Location in the clause (cf. Yutaka 2001).
To express the existence of an event in a location, two semantic elements must be
present: an event and a location. The former is expressed by “VG ^ NG”, and the latter
NGL. The configuration of “NGL ^ Event” expresses the meaning of “there exists/occursTable 1 Structural analysis of thing-existentials: Example (12)
Qiángshàng yǒu yìfú huà
Location: NGL Process: VG Existent: NG (Thing)
Table 2 Structural analysis of event-existentials: Example (3)
Táishàng chàngzhe xì
Location: NGL
Process: VG Range: NG
Existent: Event
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ther than pseudo ones.
Another semantic feature of event-existentials is impersonality. This feature distin-
guishes event-existentials as a type of uncanonical clause from canonical ones. The
latter is exemplified by:
In canonical clauses, the actor occupies the clause-initial position and it functions as
the subject as in (25). In event-existentials, the actor is deleted or demoted to some less
salient positions than the subject (Yamamoto 2006, Afonso 2008, Siewierska 2008). For
example, in (3) and (8), the Actor (i.e., the singer) and the Behaver (i.e., fùqīn) are omit-
ted and demoted to the end of the clause respectively. As a result, they take on an im-
personal feature. In terms of transitivity, only one participant is allowed in event
existentials. If the process is transitive, the actor is omitted and the only participant is
the Range as in (3). If the process is intransitive, the only participant (e.g., Behaver in (8))
is demoted to the clause-final position.
There are also such event-existentials where there is not any direct participant; the
process alone realizes the event as in (20), in which kāihuì (“have a meeting”) is a VG
realizing the process. This analysis can also be applied to (3), for chàngxì (“sing opera”)
can be taken as a VG realizing the process. This proves our point that the VG and the
NG in event-existential are highly integrated such that they form a verbal group. Event-
existentials are different from canonical clauses. They are not so concerned with the
transitive relationship between participants as with occurrence and existence of states
of affairs. The message they convey is not who does what to whom but what happened
(Davidse 1992, 1998; Halliday 2004: 284–285). The syntactic choice and configuration
help impersonalize the event, which seems to happen by itself, without being instigated
by any agent. Thus impersonalization and the meaning of existence and occurrence are
in tune with each other.
The discussion so far points to the third semantic feature of event-existentials, i.e.,
ergativity (cf. Wu 2006: 129–131). According to Halliday (1968: 182), transitivity and erga-
tivity are two complementary systems suited to construing different aspects of meaning
(cf. Lü 1987, Dixon 1994, Davidse 1998). Different languages may prefer the one over the
other. Accordingly transitivity analysis and ergativity analysis are to be employed to bring
out the respective semantic resources behind (Davidse 1992: 132, 1998). When we apply
transitivity analysis to (25) and ergativity analysis to (3), we have Tables 3 and 4.
Transitivity analysis fits well with (25), which contains both the obligatory elements
of a behavioral clause and which constitutes an answer to the probe: What is Zhang
San doing on the stage?. If we analyze (3) in terms of transitivity, the result will be
Table 3 Transitivity analysis: Example (25)
Zhāng Sān zài táishàng chàngxì
Behaver Circumstance Process: Behaviour
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taken as an appropriate answer to the probe. On the other hand, ergativity analysis of
(3) makes explicit its communicative intent. It caters to the probe: What is happening
on the stage? (Davidse 1992, 1998; Dixon 1994: 214–215).
Halliday (2004: 284–285) notes that
“Happening” means that the actualization of the process is represented as being
self-engendered, whereas ‘doing’ means that the actualization of the process is
represented as being caused by a participant that is external to the combination of
Process + Medium. This external cause is the Agent.
In the transitivity model, the nucleus is “Agent ^ Process”; the process may or may
not extend to another participant, that is, the Goal, so that there are transitive and
intransitive clauses. In the ergativity model, “Process ^ Medium” forms the nucleus
(Halliday 1994: 163). Ergativity interpretation of event-existentials spells out the
functional configuration of different elements within it, so that the event is represented as
happening by itself.
As has been clarified, the only direct participant of the process in event-existentials is
either the actor (if the process is intransitive), or the goal (if the process is transitive),
or other roles depending on the type of process involved. These are all called Medium
in ergative analysis; they are entities through the medium of which the process comes
into existence (Halliday 1994: 163). Thus, (5) can be analyzed as Table 5.
Yìbāng kè is the Medium through which the event of leaving takes place. The
Medium is the only essential elements for the process to be able to take place. Thus,
yìběn hòuhòude měilìde cídiǎn in (4), yìbāng kè in (5), zhǔxítuán in (6), qìchē in (7),
fùqīn in (8), yìzhǎn yóudēng in (9), yìkēkē hànzhū in (11), liǎngsōu chuán in (14), yígè
wǎn in (15), yíliàng chē in (16) and kèrén in (24) are all Mediums.
The other participant involved in event-existentials is Range. This is the participant
role that specifies the range or scope of the process (Halliday 1994: 146). The Range in
event-existentials is not an entity; it defines the process (ibid.). For example, in kāihuì
in (20), huì (“meeting”) is the Range. This is not an entity; there is no such thing as
meeting other than the acting of having (kāi) it. The process and the range are inte-
grated (and are realized by one lexical item), they collectively express the same event.
Thus Halliday calls it “process Range” (cf. Halliday 1994: 146–147). We propose the
analysis of “Process/Range” (i.e., the Process conflates with the Range) if they are real-
ized as one lexical item and are unanalyzable. Examples (3) and (20) are cases in point.
Table 6 is the analysis of (3).Table 4 Ergativity analysis: Example (3)
Táishàng chàngzhe xì
Location Process Range
Table 5 Ergativity analysis: Medium
Gébì diànlǐ zǒule yìbāng kè
Location Process Medium
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lexical item, the analysis of “Process ^ Range” will be more appropriate. This applies
with Examples (13) (Table 7).
The NGL in event-existentials, can be analyzed as Setting Subjects (Langacker 1991:
345–348): they are pseudo-participants with a functional affinity to circumstances.
Experientially, it denotes the Location; its function is to locate the event denoted by
“Process ^ Medium/Range”, with regard to some location expressed by itself.
According to Halliday (2004: 287), “in a more abstract sense, every process is struc-
tured in the same way, on the basis of just one variable. This variable relates to the
source of the process: what it is that brings it about. The question at issue is: Is the
process brought about from within, or from outside?” With respect to this variable, he
recognizes two types of clause in terms of ergativity, i.e., ergative and non-ergative
clauses. In the former the source is explicated, while in the latter it is not (cf. Davidse
1998: 102–105). Thus, non-ergative clauses are employed to express happenings, espe-
cially when the cause is not clear. Event-existentials are non-ergatives; the cause of the
event (i.e., agent/instigator) is suppressed, so that what is presented is the happening,
rather than what causes it to happen. This explains why there is only one direct participant
in event-existentials, or even there is no participant at all: Only the process or process and
medium/range are present for expressing the event. The whole clause communicates the
existence of the event through the configuration of “Location ^ Event”.Continuous relationship between the two types of existentials
The term event-existential is proposed in contrast to that of thing-existential. This does
not mean that the two types of existentials are discrete categories with a clear-cut
borderline between them. Rather, they form a continuum, each occupying a pole.
Within each category, the members are not homogeneous. They contain different
sub-categories, showing different degrees of eventuality and thingness. For example,
there are static and dynamic existentials within thing-existentials. Song (2007: 59)
finds it hard to decide whether such clauses as the following should be subsumed
under the one or the other without being arbitrary:
This heterogeneous feature also holds true for event-existentials, which, as we have
discussed, comprise different subtypes, i.e., pseudo-existentials, clauses of (dis)appearance,
PSPO clauses. They fade into the other pole towards thing-existentials. The continuousTable 6 Process conflating with Range: Example (3)
Táishàng chàngzhexì
Location Process/Range
Table 7 Analyzable Process and Range: Exmaple (13)
Zhāng Sānjiā fāshēngle yìqǐ móushā’àn
Location Process Range
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which can be read as either (see the following discussion):
In the remainder of this section, we will elaborate on the continuous relationship
by locating different types of thing- and event-existentials along the continuum. At
the pole of thing-existentials are static existentials, which gradually give way to dy-
namic existentials, clauses of (dis)appearance, and PSPO clauses, until reaching the
other pole, that of event-existentials, typically represented by pseudo-existentials
(Figure 1).
This continuum can be seen as diminuendo-crescendo from thingness to eventuality
or vice versa, depending on from which end one starts. Typical thing-existentials exclu-
sively express the existence of things. The clause-middle process is realized by the verbs
yǒu and shì (e.g., (10)). These are light verbs (Huang 1998, Lin 2008: 74–76). They are
non-salient and usually do not take aspect or tense markers; their main function is to
link the location to the existent. The clause final NG, which realizes the existent, is
comparatively salient. It often takes numerals and classifiers as premodifiers. Shen
(1995) calls such NGs bounded (cf. Yutaka 2001). This sub-type of existentials carries
the strongest thingness.
There are other static existentials whose processes are realized by VGs other than
yǒu and shì, e.g.,
Apart from expressing existence, such existentials also indicate the means of exist-
ence (e.g., guàzhe in (28)). The VG takes such aspect markers as zhe and le. The whole
clause takes on some eventuality.Figure 1 Continuous relationship between thing- and event-existentials.
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into presupposition, and dynamicity rises into assertion.
Example (29) expresses not so much that “there are wild chrysanthemum blossoms
in the autumn wind” as that “chrysanthemum blossoms are swaying in the autumn
wind”. The process is obviously dynamic. It does not only take the aspect markers -zhe
and -le, but also can be premodified by zhèng and zhèngzàid. On the other hand, the
clause-final NG often does not take numerals and classifiers as premodifiers. All these
show that, compared with static existentials, dynamic existentials are losing thingness
and gaining eventuality (Song 2007: 49–57)e.
Eventuality is even more evident in clauses of (dis)appearance (e.g., (4) and (5)). As the
term (dis)appearance suggests, its primary experiential function is not to assert existence,
but (dis)appearance, though the former might be its presupposition or entailmentf. (Dis)
appearance is eventual by nature. The VG often takes the perfective marker -le. This
shows the strong bounded nature of the process, and the prominence of the event
denoted by the process (Shen 1995, 2004). This also holds for PSPO clauses. In gen-
eral, it can be said clauses of (dis)appearance and PSPO clauses exhibit stronger
eventuality and weaker thingness than dynamic existentials.
Eventuality is the strongest and thingness is the weakest in pseudo-existentials (e.g., (3)
and (20)). The VG and the NG are closely integrated with each other, and they collectively
express events instead of things. As is with dynamic existentials, the VG is highly dynamic
and prominent in that it can be premodified by zhèng and zhèngzài and it takes the per-
fective marker -zhe. Correspondingly, the clause-final NG is unbounded and non-salient
in that it does not take numerals and classifiers as premodifiers (Wu 2006: 89). Here, as in
all other cases, the diminuendo-crescendo of the two kinds of prominence is in perfect
trading-off and cooperation.
As we have suggested above, the continuous relationship between the two types of
existentials also finds expression in the degree of integration between the clause-middle
VG and the clause-final NG. In yǒu/shì-existentials, the verb is semantically non-salient; it
only functions to link the clause-initial NGL and the clause-final NG. But the link is loose
in that lengthy premodifiers can be inserted before the NG (Song 2007: 12, 79). It is only
true with such existentials that the clause-middle yǒu/shì can be omitted, without radic-
ally changing the meaning. In other static and dynamic existentials, the VG and the NG
are more closely integrated. In many cases, the NG is a bare noun so that the VG and NG
are juxtaposed next to each other, without any element in between. Compared with static
existentials, dynamic ones have a more integrated configuration of “VG ^ NG”. And it is
less likely for there to be any insertion (Song 2007: 71).
In pseudo-existentials, the two are mostly closely integrated so much so that they
sometimes form a single word or an idiomatic expression as in (3) and (20). This is
the only subtype that does not allow any insertion of numeral and classifier between
the VG and the NG in order for the clause to be grammatical (Fan 1963: 395, Wu
2006: 89):
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He takes (27) as representing a dynamic activity, i.e., the action of mounting cannons is
taking place on the mountain, rather than the static existence of some cannons on the
mountain. Pào is the Range of the Process jià. Thus (27b) is ungrammatical.
On the other hand, if the NG takes numeral-classifier as premodifier, the NG will be-
come bounded and much more prominent. Thus, the link between the VG and the NG
becomes relatively loose and thingness will increase, as shown in the following two
examples:
Wu (2006: 45) notes that the VG and the NG in pseudo-existentials form integrated
words or word groups, while those in dynamic existentials stand in a verb-object relation-
ship to one another. In functional linguistic terms, the former are “Process ^ Range”, while
the latter are “Process ^ Medium”. The former constitutes a closer integration, both serving
the function of expressing the process (Halliday 1994: 146).
In general, the continuous relationship between the two types of existentials lies in
the trading-off between thingness and eventuality. The prominence of the one means
the obscurity of the others, and vice versa. The prominence and obscurity are the
fullest at the two poles.
Wang and Zhou Functional Linguistics 2014, 1:7 Page 15 of 17
http://www.functionallinguistics.com/content/1/1/7Conclusion
The existential in Chinese is a much-addressed topic because of its particular syntactic
and semantic features. Since the 1950s many achievements have been made in the def-
inition, scope clarification, and classification of this construction. There are new in-
sights appearing from time to time. These include the distinction between dynamic and
static, genuine and pseudo-existentials, and the metaphorical extension on typical exis-
tentials. But there also exist some problems. For example, in discussing the semantics,
previous literature does not distinguish the cases where existence is the asserted mean-
ing from those where it is the presupposition or the entailment. A clause should not be
taken as an existential because it presupposes the existence of some entity, for such a
presupposition is present in most clauses other than those where existence is asserted.
Another often-ignored distinction is that the existent in the existential may be either a
thing or an event.
In order to account for a group of clause patterns which are closely related to the ex-
istential, but which are not its typical members, we put forward a new term, event-
existential, in contrast to thing-existential. The former includes the so-called pseudo-
existentials, PSPO clauses, dynamic existentials, and (dis)appearance existentials. They
all express existence of events, rather than things. The two types of existentials share
the structure of “NGL ^ VG ^ NG”, though the semantic configurations are different:
In event-existentials, the VG and NG express the event, whose existence is expressed
through its configuration with the clause-initial NGL. Therefore, event-existentials show
the semantic features of existentiality and eventuality.
There is only one direct participant in event-existentials; this is either the actor if the
process is intransitive or the goal or range if the process is transitive. With the instiga-
tor of the event omitted or demoted to the end of the clause, the subject function is left
to the NGL. This renders the clause impersonal.
Another feature of event-existentials is ergativity. Functionally they can be analyzed
into “Location ^ Process ^ Medium/Range”. This fits well with the ergative pattern.
These four semantic features are coordinated and unified within the same clause. It
expresses the existence of events (not things), rather than the transitive relation of who
does what to whom. Finally, there is not a clear-cut borderline between the two types of
existentials. Rather, they form a continuum. The continuity finds expression in the
diminuendo-crescendo of thingness or eventuality, the prominence of the process or
the clause-final medium/range, and the degree to which the two are integrated.
Endnotes
aList of abbreviations: CLS = classifier, PEF = perfective, PRG = progressive, RED =
Reduplication.
bIf we change (8) into WángMiǎn yǒu fùqīn. (“Wang Mian has a father.”), by replacing
sǐle with yǒu, the meaning of (8) will be drastically changed, with presupposed meaning
being brought to the forefront and becoming the asserted meaning.
cApart from Range, there is another function that the NG may realize, i.e., Medium.
(See the following discussion.)
dAccording to Chen (1999), scope of -zhe and zài are different, though they both
express progressive aspect. -Zhe is restricted to the verb itself; it indicates a homoge-
neous, continuous and repetitive situation. Whereas the progressive meaning of zài
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(cf. Fan 2007: 91).
eAccording to Song (2007: 71), most of the NGs in static existentials usually take
numeral-classifier premodifiers; but the majority of the NGs (65%) in dynamic existen-
tials do not take such premodifiers.
fThe existential meaning is the entailed meaning of clauses of appearance. For ex-
ample, (4) entails the existence of yìběn hòuhòude měilìde cídiǎn. It is the presupposed
meaning of clauses of disappearance. For example, (5) presupposes the existence of
yìbāng kè. (See Note b.)
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